m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 46, no. 1 (2008) 25-42 [25] Metaphysics H 6 and the Problem of Unity H y e -K y U n g K i m * h 6 is undoubtedly one of the most puzzling chapters of the Metaphysics. The unity of the definition of a thing is discussed. That much is uncontroversial. What is controversial is what the object and purpose of the inquiry of that chapter is.
Commentators are divided. Some claim that Aristotle is arguing for the unity of the definition of form, others that he is arguing for the unity of the definition of composite substance, and virtually everyone agrees that there is an explanatory primacy of the unity of one definition to the other. either the unity of the definition of form is taken to be explained by analogy to the unity of the definition of composite substance, 1 or the unity of the definition of composite substance is taken to be explained by analogy to the unity of the definition of form.
2 However, precisely what is puzzling about H 6 is that both the unity of the definition of form and the unity of the definition of composite substance are discussed. my view is that both sets of commentators are wrong.
26
journal of the history of philosophy 46:1 january 2008 in this paper i will argue that Aristotle's main concern in H 6 is to argue for both the causelessness 3 of the unity of the definition of form and the causelessness of the unity of the definition of composite substance, and not merely for the unity of either, or for the explanatory primacy of one to the other. By 'causelessness' i mean the absence of a unifying cause of the parts of a thing. On my interpretation, Aristotle argues that there is no need for a unifying cause of the parts of the definition of form or the parts of the definition of composite substance. He argues as much because doing so dissolves a possible problem which arises from applying a metaphysical principle he holds-that the parts of a thing form a unity by virtue of a unifying cause-to the parts of the definition of form and to the parts of the definition of composite substance. The problem is that, if this principle applies to the definition either of form or of composite substance, then (1) the status of form as primary substance is threatened, (2) composite substance as a composite of form and matter cannot be a substance, and (3) the notion of definition as a formula of essence is threatened.
4 For this reason, in H 6 Aristotle does not argue merely for the unity of definition, but for the causelessness of the unity of the definition, both of form and of composite substance. As far as which unity Aristotle is inquiring into in H 6, there is no "either/or" from which to choose. The correct interpretation of H 6 is closer to "both/and." i present two arguments for my interpretation.
i shall argue, first, that the proper identification of the aim of the inquiry of H 6 indicates that Aristotle's intention is to defend the theory of substance-as-cause by dealing with a possible problem that arises from a combination of (a) speaking about the parts of the definition of form and the parts of the definition of composite substance, and (b) the principle that parts of a whole need a unifying cause in order to be one and not many. Aristotle has (a') spoken about the parts of the definition of form and the parts of the definition of composite substance.
5 He has also (b') claimed that the parts of a whole must have a unifying cause in order to be one and not many.
6 Do the definition of form and the definition of composite substance, then, have a unifying cause for their unity? A possible problem arises from thinking that they do. if the definition of form needs a unifying cause, form cannot be primary substance, since the unifying cause of a formula is the unifying cause of a thing and, as such, is the unifying cause of form. For Aristotle form is primary substance in virtue of being the cause of the being of composite things, and of having no other cause for its own being. if there is a cause of the being 27 m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y of form-namely, a unifying cause of the parts of the definition of form-then that cause, not form, is primary substance, since it would be prior to form. if the definition of composite substance needs a unifying cause of its parts, form and matter, then form and matter would be a mere heap, since form and matter in the definition would turn out to refer to parts that need to be unified by a further cause.
7 Again, this is nonsense and must be rejected. Second, i shall examine exactly how the causelessness in the unity of the definition of form and in the unity of the definition of composite substance is discussed in H 6. A close reading of H 6 shows that Aristotle neither limits the discussion of the unity of definition to form or composite substance, nor ranks, in an explanatory fashion, the unity of one to the other. Rather, he argues that both the unity of the definition of form and the unity of the definition of composite substance are to be accounted for without a unifying cause. Contrary to what has been widely maintained, there is no textual evidence to suggest that either unity is the exclusive, major, explanatory concern of H 6. in dealing with the unity of definition, the difficulty and the solution offered to that difficulty focus on the cause of unity, and Aristotle's main claim is that there is no unifying cause of the parts of definition.
1 . t h e t h e o r y o f s u b s t a n c e -a s -c a u s e a n d t h e u n i t y -c a u s e p r i n c i p l e H 6 aims to clarify an apparent problem concerning the parts of the definition of form and the parts of the definition of composite substance. This problem arises in the theory of substance-as-cause which is presented in Z 17, because on that theory neither a cause of the unity of form nor a cause of the unity of composite substance would be needed, and thus the parts of the definition of form and the parts of the definition of composite substance would not need a unifying cause of its parts. However, a difficulty arises, and it is discussed in H 6 and H 3.
Definition and Unity in H3
At the beginning of H 6, Aristotle announces that he is returning to the difficulty he faced regarding the unity of definition and the unity of numbers. "To return to the difficulty which has been stated with respect both to definitions and to numbers, what is the cause (ai[ tion) of their unity?" (1045a7-8) 8 The main topic of H 6 is a function of this difficulty. most likely, the problem Aristotle is referring to is the one mentioned in H 3. in Z 12, Aristotle had discussed the problem of the unity of definition. That discussion, however, is not concerned with numbers at all. moreover, Aristotle does not mention any difficulty in Z 12, even though he suggests that there might be another account-or a more detailed account-of 28 journal of the history of philosophy 46:1 january 2008 the unity of definition.
9 in H 3, however, he mentions a problem regarding the cause of the unity of definition and numbers, and at H 3 1044a2-9, number is compared to substance. One way in which substance and number are alike, he tells us, is that both number and substance seem to be unities composed of many parts, and that such unities need an explanation.
And the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many); and the definition is one, but similarly they cannot say what makes it one. And this is a natural result; for the same reason is applicable, and substance is one in the sense which we have explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort of unit or point; each is a complete reality and a definite nature. (H 3 1044a2-9) The point made in the passage is that "these thinkers," Platonists, cannot explain what it is that makes a definition a unity. 'Substance' refers primarily to form. it is an actuality (ej ntelev ceia) and a nature (fuv si~). Thus, there must be something in virtue of which the parts of the definition of substance, which refers, for Platonists, to separate Forms such as Animal itself and Two-footedness itself, are one and not many. Platonists, however, cannot explain the unity of the parts of a definition. Hence the difficulty Aristotle mentions at the beginning of H 6 is probably the difficulty mentioned in H 3, and we must determine precisely what that difficulty is. earlier in the same chapter Aristotle argues that positing a unifying cause for a definition leads to the absurd consequence that the parts of a definition would refer only to matter, and thus a definition would be a formula of matter only.
nor is man animal + biped [to; zw/ on kai; div poun,] but there must be something besides these, if these are matter-something which is neither an element [in the whole] nor a compound, but is the substance; but this people eliminate, and state only the matter. if then, this is the cause of the thing's being, and if the cause of its being is its substance, they will not be stating the substance itself. (1043b10-14) man is not, Aristotle claims, merely composed of two parts, animality and two-footedness, as stated in its definition. if man is animal and two-footedness put together, then in the definition, 'animal' and 'two-footed' refer to parts that need to be unified by a unifying cause. Aristotle is here arguing that the search for the unifying cause of the parts of definition, such as "biped" and "animal," leads to the absurd consequence that a definition does not state substance in the sense of cause. if there is a unifying cause for the parts of a definition, then the parts of the definition are merely parts to be unified, namely material parts, and thus the definition is not of substance but of matter only. The form of which the definition is consequently turns out to be merely matter. And the definition does not state substance.
For this reason, in H 3, Aristotle commends the idea of not defining substance. This idea has its roots in the idea of avoiding the attempt to provide a unifying cause for a definition. He thinks that in this passage Aristotle abandons defining simple things, including forms. m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y Therefore, the point which used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain timeliness. They said that the 'what' cannot be defined (for a definition so called is a long rigmarole), but that it is possible to explain what sort a thing, e.g., silver, is, for instance, that it is like tin. Therefore, one kind of substance can be defined, and formulated, i.e., the composite kind, whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which it consists cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form. (1043b24-33) People who try to avoid defining form have a certain understanding of the nature of definition, Aristotle claims here, since they at least understand that the definition of form cannot have a unifying cause of its parts. The "point" which Aristotle commends is not the fact that they do not define simple things, but the reason why they do not define simple things. The reason is that otherwise there would be a need for an infinite number of unifying causes. The definition of form is composed of parts, so the parts of such a definition need a unifying cause, and the insoluble problem just mentioned would arise. The definition, then, would not be of substance, which has no cause other than itself. The people Aristotle commends explain what kind of thing substance is like, instead of explaining substance in a definition. Aristotle calls their way of defining "timely," since it does not allow for a unifying cause and avoids an insoluble problem. Of course, their solution results in the absurd conclusion that no substance has a formula, and so is not acceptable.
11 The rejection of the indefinability of substance is declared and discussed in Z 13 and Z 16. in an illuminating commentary on Z, Aristotle's Theory of Substance, michael Wedin argues that in Z 13 Aristotle is mainly "worr [ied] about the structure of form,"
12 conceived as substance, and that in Z 16 Aristotle resolves the difficulty by declaring the potential existence of the parts of form for the unity of form.
13 Substance, then, can be defined, even if it is actually a unity. it should be noted, however, that this view is the outcome of the recognition of a dilemma in the first place.
The same difficulty arising from taking form or its definition as having parts is stated in Z 17. At 1041b11 -35, form is said to be substance by being the cause of the being of composite substance. But if form is composed of parts, then there should be another cause that unifies the parts of form. This leads to an infinite regress of causes in futile pursuit of a unifying cause. The idea of form's being composed of parts is condemned because of the absurdity of such an infinite regress.
The same line of reasoning applies, and must apply, to the unity of the definition of composite substance. Composite substance is defined in terms of form and matter, and therefore, since it appears to have parts, seems to be in need of a unifying cause. in H 2 Aristotle claims that the definition of composite sub- 14 if there is a unifying cause of form and matter, the form that is the cause of the being of a composite substance (and which cause is said to be primary substance in Z 17) has to be regarded as merely a part that needs to be unified by a unifying cause. Composite substance would thus turn out to be a collection of parts standing in need of a unifying cause. if that were so, form would not play the role of cause, and a composite substance would not be a substance but a mere potentiality to be actualized. That is absurd.
Thus the problem of complexity of form and unity of definition is a recurring theme in Z. The difficulty Aristotle is addressing at the beginning of H 6 arises from the problem-the dilemma-that in taking the parts of the definitions as the parts to be unified, form and composite substance both do and do not need a unifying cause. even though he does not mention composite substance as such at the beginning of H 6, the problem he is dealing with is just as much a problem for composite substance as it is for form. if the parts of the definition of composite substance need a unifying cause, then form could not be primary substance and a composite substance, as form and matter, would be a mere heap. Both definitions seem to be in need of a unifying cause, but both do not and cannot have a unifying cause.
Definition and Unity in H6
Textual evidence for this interpretation of H 6 can be found at the beginning of that chapter. Aristotle there explains the basis and nature of the dilemma, and especially the reason why there would be a need for a unifying cause for the definition of form and the definition of composite substance. He also explains why, despite appearances, there really is no need for such a unifying cause.
The root of the problem is the principle that all unities that have parts need a unifying cause. At the beginning of H 6, Aristotle presents an argument for the view that every unity made of parts, including form and composite substance, has a unifying cause:
in the case of all things which have several parts [pleiv w mev rh] and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause [ai[ tion] ; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And a definition is a set of words which is one not by being connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object. (1045a7-14)
Here Aristotle introduces and explains the principle that the parts of a whole must be unified by a unifying cause. especially for a definition which deals with one object, form, Aristotle argues that the oneness of definition must be accounted for by a cause, since a definition is not merely a set of words which are strung
14
At 1043b14-18 Aristotle writes: "And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who propose 'a receptacle to shelter chattels and living being,' or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Those who combine both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form." m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y together. The same principle was also stated in Z 17 15 and H 3. 16 i will call this the Unity-Cause Principle to facilitate future reference. note that the principle says that a unifying cause is required for all things which are composed of parts and are not mere heaps (pav ntwn ga; r o{ sa pleiv w mev rh e[ cei kai; mh; e[ stin oi| on swro; to; paǹ: aj ll j e[ sti ti to; o} lon para; ta; mov ria, e[ sti ti ai [ tion) . it thus has universal scope-at least seemingly-for the simple reason that for anything whatsoever, if it lacked a unifying cause, there would be no reason to consider it an "it"-a single thing-at all. With no unity of parts, a supposed whole composed of parts would reduce to many, becoming a mere heap.
17
What this means is that, since both the definition of form and the definition of composite substance have parts, the principle apparently applies to both. The definition of composite substance is composed of parts, with the parts referring to matter and form. The definition of form also has parts. in Z and H there are several passages in which Aristotle mentions parts of the definition of form or parts of form. "Let us inquire about the parts of which substance consists," he says at 1034b31, with 'substance' here referring to form. At 1035b12-19 he assumes that the definition of the soul, the form of man, has parts:
But those which are of the nature of parts of the formula, and of the substance according to its formula, are prior [to the whole], either all or some of them. And since the soul of animals [for this is the substance of a living being] is their substance according to the formula, i.e., the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind . . . so that the parts of soul are prior, either all or some of them, to the concrete "animal." even more explicitly, at 1035b31-33, he states that form as well as composite substance has parts, and the parts of a definition-the elements of a definition are termed "parts"--refer to the parts of a thing.
The Unity-Cause principle, then, certainly seems to apply to the parts of the definition of form and to the parts of the definition of composite substance. However,
15
"Since that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable . . . the syllable, then, is something-not only its element (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else . . . it is the cause which makes this thing flesh and that a syllable . . . And this is the substance of each thing (for this is the primary cause of its being)." (1041b11-27)
16
At 1044a2-5 Aristotle states that if a thing is a whole composed of parts, and not a heap, then there must be a cause: "And the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many)."
17
The Unity-Cause Principle is both explicit and implicit in Z and H. At Z 16 1040b5-10, Aristotle suggests that a material thing is more than a mere collection of material parts. if material parts and matter, such as earth, fire, and air, are a unified whole, there must be something other than these material elements to account for their unity. He states that "evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies-both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them" (1040b5-10). The same view can be found at H 3 1044a4-5, where Aristotle states that if a thing is a one and not a heap, "we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many." Similarly, at H 6 1045a10-12 he claims that there is even a cause of the unity of mere bodies, which are the weakest examples of unity: "for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality." it will be helpful to look at Aristotle's solution to the problem before addressing these questions, since the solution will itself aid in identifying the problem. With the problem identified, the problematic way people usually understand definition will also be clearer.
The solution to the problem is to take one part as form and another as matter. Taking them this way is taking the parts as "one and the same thing" (1045b18). This means that the problematic way of taking definition is to understand the parts of definition as two different things, not one and the same thing. The problem that arises if definition is so understood is that there would then be a need for a unifying cause of those parts. This, Aristotle says, is the wrong way to conceptualize the issue. if one part of the definition is taken as form and the other as matter, the parts are not parts that need to be unified by something else. The parts are nominally two, but they are really one; and thus the Unity-Cause Principle, though valid, has no application. in other words, with definition so understood, as Aristotle says, "the difficulty disappears" (1045a29). This means that, even if the definition of form and the definition of composite substance have parts, there is no need for either to have a unifying cause. They are already unities.
This solution indicates that the main concern of H 6 is to address the dilemma that arises from the Unity-Cause Principle-which seems to imply that the definition of form and the definition of composite substance must have unifying causes-and the theory of substance as cause-which implies that form and composite substance, which is composed of form and matter, cannot have unifying causes. The solution to this dilemma, Aristotle says, is that the Unity-Cause Principle does not apply to the parts of the definition of form and to the parts of the definition of composite substance. Properly understood, there is nothing to which to apply it. in effect, this solution can also be found in On the Soul 412b6-9, 18 Bostock, Metaphysics, 280-81. Bostock calls this way of interpreting the phrase "the orthodox interpretation" and claims that it is mistaken. He argues that Aristotle rejects this type of definition, since, according to him, it ignores the cause of the being of the composite universal, man. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Aristotle explicitly condemns the usual way of defining or offers a new kind of definition instead. The so-called orthodox interpretation seems to me correct.
where Aristotle claims that a unity between form and matter, or actuality and potentiality, is proper unity, and that a question about their unity must be dismissed as unnecessary. 19 The unity of the parts of definition, the parts taken as form and matter, needs no further explanation.
This does not mean that the Unity-Cause Principle is false. As Aristotle says, "even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality" (1045a10-11). However, the Unity-Cause Principle does not apply to the parts that are form and matter. Parts such as form and matter fit together without a unifying cause. The definition of composite substance as form and matter does not fall under the principle or need to be unified. nor does the definition of form fall under the principle or need to be unified. Form is a unity or a whole, but it is not a whole made out of many parts, and composite substance is a whole but not made of many parts. The components of definition explain a thing, and in a sense they can be called parts.
20 However, 'parts' is said in many ways. The parts of definition are not two different things, but one and the same thing. However, to say that parts of form are form and matter, or potentiality and actuality, is not to say that form is composed of form and matter. Form is a simple thing; it has neither actual parts nor actual matter. As Wedin correctly says, respecting the simplicity and complexity of form and its definability, form has a functional complexity.
21 its parts are potential in the sense that they cannot exist apart from actuality, much as genus is matter for differentia in definition by division, as indicated in Z 12. Thus, form and matter are not two different things, but one thing. The 'parts' of definition refer to one and the same thing: form or actuality. The definition of man, for example, as "two-footed animal" (in H 6) has parts, and the parts of animality are the functional parts of man, which cannot exist apart from two-footedness. As Wedin correctly argues, the discussion of the potential existence of parts of form advances "our understanding of how a thing's substance can be complex without containing actual parts."
22 it also advances our understanding of how a thing's substance can be simple while having parts.
if this is correct, metaphysically speaking, Aristotle's main concern in H 6 is the causeless unity of the definition of form and the definition of composite substance. The notion of a causeless unity is needed to prevent a misunderstanding from arising about the parts of definition and to prevent a misapplication of the Unity-Cause Principle. it is in preventing those two mistakes that Aristotle also defends his theory of substance-namely his view of Substance-as-Cause-against an ill-considered but seemingly powerful destructive dilemma that threatens it.
19
"That is why we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as though we were to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but the proper one is that of actuality."
20
At D 25 1023b22-24, Aristotle claims that "the elements in the definition which explains a thing are also parts of the whole." 2 . a t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s o f h 6 in this section, i shall argue further that a close reading of H 6 reveals that Aristotle is concerned with the causelessness of the unity of the definition of form and of the unity of the definition of composite substance.
The Causeless Unity of the Definition of Form

2.1.1
Aristotle asks for the cause of the unity of the definition of form at the beginning of H 6, when he asks, "What makes man a unity?" What, then, is it that makes man one; why is he one and not many, e.g., animal + biped, especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are not those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped? (1045a14-19) We need to explain, Aristotle says, why 'biped animal', which refers to man, is one, not many. Plato's theory of Forms offers no help here, and in fact leads to an absurd multiplicity of man: man would be two and not one if, as Plato thinks, 'animal' and 'biped' refer to two things.
But commentators have read this passage in different ways. Halper claims that 'man' in 1045a14 refers to the universal man, not to form, and that Aristotle is discussing the unity of the definition of composite substance. i find no evidence for this claim. On the contrary, there are three reasons for believing that 'man' refers to form and that Aristotle is discussing form and its definition. The first is that Aristotle refers to form by the definition "biped animal" in Z 12, and here in H 6 uses exactly the same definition. Unless there is a reason to think otherwise, 'biped animal' should be taken to refer to the same thing.
The second reason is that Aristotle distinguishes the form "man" (a[ nqropo~) from composite substances, "men" (a[ nqropoi). He mentions the problem of the unity of the Platonic Form "man" in conjunction with the problem of the unity of "man," and claims that a problem with the unity of the Form "man" would also mean a problem with the unity of composite substances, "men." men, as composite substances, are caused to exist by the Form "man." Since, as argued in Z 17, Aristotelian form is also the cause of the being of composite substance, it follows that the implications of the problem of the unity of the definition of form for the unity of the definition of composite substance are the same in the case of Aristotelian form and Platonic form. 23 Here Aristotle admits that an explanation of the unity of the definition of form is necessary for an explanation of the unity of the definition of composite substance. But the force of this argument must not be misunderstood. The definition of form has parts, and insofar as the Unity-Cause Principle is applied to those parts, the unity of the definition of form needs to be explained. This, however, does not mean that the unity of the definition of form automatically explains the unity of the definition of composite substance. Composite substance is defined in terms of form and matter. The unity of the
23
The same interpretation is found in the commentary on H 6 in Notes. m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y definition of form itself does not and cannot explain how, in that definition, form and matter are a whole. From the point of view of the Unity-Cause Principle, something is still lacking. A third piece of evidence is Aristotle's remark: "for this difficulty is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of 'cloak' . . . so the question is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze'?" (1045a25-29). The difficulty of explaining the unity of 'round bronze' is the same as that of explaining the unity of 'biped animal.' moreover, Aristotle offers the same solution to both problems. The definition 'round bronze' refers to the composite of form and matter. 24 The problem is that if 'biped animal' is the definition of the composite, Aristotle's remark at 1045a25-29, which was cited earlier, is needlessly redundant. For there is no point in repeating the same difficulty and then repeating the same solution in respect to the same kind of definition, the definition of composite substance. This is especially true of Aristotle, whose writing is notoriously condensed (not to say, dense).
2.1.2
To the question "What makes man one?" Aristotle answers that taking the components of the definition to be matter and form, or potentiality and actuality, makes the problem disappear. He claims that, in this case of a form that does not have matter, there is no cause of unity other than form itself, and thus there is no cause of the unity of its definition.
But if as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty . . . What, then, causes this-that which was potentially to be actually-except, in the case of things that are generated, the agent? For there is no other cause of the potentially sphere's becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either. Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g., the circle is "a plane figure." But of the things which have no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, each is by its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of being-individual substance, quality . . . and the essence of each of them is by its nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of being-and so none of these has any reason [ai[ tion] outside itself for being one, nor for being a kind of being. (1045a26-1045b5) Here Aristotle reformulates the question of the cause of the unity of two elements, form and matter, in definition into a question of the cause of potentiality being or becoming actuality. The answer is essence in general, which is the efficient cause or agent in the case of generation and corruption; and in the case of being, the final cause.
25 However, in the case of things which have no matter, there is no cause (ai[ tion) of what is taken as potentiality to be actuality. There is just a unity, and thus there is no cause of unity except itself. This means that there is no cause at all of the unity and being of form except itself, and likewise no cause of the unity of the definition of form. Form can be formulated in a definition whose parts are taken
24
At Z 7 1033b25-26 Aristotle states that a concrete particular, such as Callias, is analogous to this brazen sphere, while man and animal are analogous to "brazen sphere" in general. to be matter and form, but there is no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, in form. Form is metaphysically simple but constitutes a whole, since in one sense of the term, we can speak of its parts. The parts of form, however, constitute a whole without having or needing any unifying cause. Since it is itself a unity, there is no cause of matter being or becoming actuality. There are various functions of form and thus various parts of form, for example, the various functions of the soul of human beings, but the soul is one and a whole by itself.
2.1.3
At least two arguments could be advanced against my interpretation. The first is that the unity of the parts of the definition of form, genus and differentia is already argued for in Z 12, and thus there is no need to explain the unity of the parts of the definition of form. 26 The second is that the discussion of the unity of the parts of the definition of form in H 6 functions only to explain the unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance.
27 i will consider these arguments in turn. The first argument against my interpretation is due to Halper. Halper claims that in Z 12 Aristotle "shows that the form is one because its formula can consist of only a single constituent, the ultimate differentia."
28 The need for H 6, Halper thinks, arises from the identification of form as the cause of the unity of the material elements of a composite substance in Z 17. Such an identification "still leaves open the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the form and the material elements." 29 According to Halper, then, in H 6 Aristotle addresses only the difficulty of explaining the unity of the form and the material parts of composite substance. That problem was not adequately addressed in Z 17. in order to support his interpretation, Halper argues that Aristotle's mention of "contact, stickiness, or some other such quality" at H 6 1045a10-12 entails that he has the unity of the parts of a composite in mind, since these are the causes of bodily continuity.
30 He also argues that Aristotle's discussion of the unity of sphere and bronze at 1045a25-30 indicates that the unity of the definition of composite substance is at issue in H 6. even though he notices the similarity of the formulation of the questions at Z 12 and H 6, he claims that "despite similarities with the formulation of the problem of Z 12," the issue of H 6 is the unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance.
There are two reasons for thinking that Halper is wrong about this. The first reason is that, although Halper is right that in Z 12 an explanation of the unity of the definition of form is offered, that does not mean that in H 6 the unity of the definition of form is not discussed. if my argument on the issue of H 6 is correct, the major issue in that chapter is a problem that arises from applying the UnityCause Principle to the parts of definition. But the Unity-Cause Principle raises the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the definition of form just as much as it
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Halper, "Metaphysics," 150. ibid. This is easily refuted. Aristotle here is merely emphasizing that even the weakest instance of unity, a body, has a unifying cause. m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y does for the unity of the definition of composite substance. Looking at the parts of definition from the perspective of the Unity-Cause Principle and explaining the problem arising from it is definitely a new issue. There is thus ample reason why Aristotle would discuss the unity of the definition of form again in H 6. The second reason is that if, as Halper argues, Aristotle understands the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the definition of form and the material elements in Z 17, then he must do so in virtue of recognition of the broader problem that there needs to be an account of the unity of parts into a whole. in Z 17 he argues that there is a cause of the unity of the material parts of a composite substance. moreover, if, as Halper himself claims, Aristotle is aware of the difficulty of explaining the unity of the cause and the material elements, then he has already taken the cause and the material elements as parts of a thing, and the parts as being unified by a unifying cause. if not, there would be no reason to think that there is a difficulty in explaining the unity of the cause and the material elements. Such a problem does not arise automatically. There is such a problem only if the material parts and the cause that is form are regarded as parts of a composite substance whose unity is to be accounted for. So, if there is a problem of the unity of the cause and the material parts of composite substance, the problem arises from the felt need that the parts be unified into a whole. if, then, Halper is right in thinking that H 6 is concerned with a problem left over from Z 17, that problem is most likely discussed in relation both to the parts of the definition of form and to the parts of the definition of composite substance. Thus, even though there is a problem left hanging in Z 17, that fact alone does not entail that the object of the inquiry of H 6 is the unity of the definition of composite substance alone, or the unity of the definition of form alone. in conjunction with the view that substance is cause, the Unity-Cause Principle raises the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the definition of form just as much as it does for the unity of the definition of composite substance. Since the whole corpus of Aristotle's work shows that he is a penetrating and systematic philosopher who recognizes the implications of the principles of his philosophy, and thus possible misunderstandings of those principles, it is very likely that he would see one potential problem in two areas of application, and thus in need of a single solution. And that is why, if the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the definition of the composite is recognized and addressed in H 6, the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the parts of the definition of form would also be recognized and addressed there.
The second argument against my interpretation is due to gill. gill argues that the topic of the unity of the definition of form, that is, the unity of genus and differentia, is introduced in H 6 in order to explain the unity of the definition of composite substance. She thinks that composite substance is claimed to be primary substance in H 6 as a result of Aristotle arguing for the unity of the definition of composite substance. "The unity of genus and differentia which is explained in Z 12 is unproblematic," 31 she says, and Aristotle mentions the unity of genus and differentia to "recall how the genus and differentia are unified."
32 According to her, recalling how they are unified is needed in order to solve the problem of the unity of form and matter. This is mistaken. As pointed out above, in Z 12 Aristotle compares genus to matter in order to explain the unity of genus and differentia. Thus, the unity of genus and differentia does not explain the unity of form and matter. When the unity of the definition of the components of composite substance is examined, and a solution is offered in terms of the unity of the definition of form, it would then be circular, and thus non-explanatory, to take the unity of genus and differentia as a model for explaining the unity of the definition of form and matter. moreover, in H 6 there is no evidence to suggest that Aristotle uses the unity of the definition of form to explain the unity of the definition of composite substance. As mentioned above (section 1.1),the unity of the definition of form is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the unity of the definition of composite substance. Both philosophically and textually, the best conclusion to draw is that the unity of the definition of form is a genuine problem in H 6. As before, however, that does not mean that the primary issue of H 6 is the unity of the definition of form over and above the unity of the definition of the composite. The genuine problem of accounting for the unity of the definition of composite substance and the unity of the definition of form must be seen in terms of accounting for how the parts of definition constitute a whole, without a unifying cause.
The Causeless Unity of the Definition of Composite Substance
Composite particular substances such as horses are unities, and thus more than the sum of their material parts. But if they are unities, and more than the sum of their parts, something must account for the fact that they are unities-account, that is, for the fact that a horse is not just a hoof + a foot + an ankle + a shin + . . . all thrown together. Composite substances, thus material objects composed of parts, and especially living beings, are the most obvious things in need of a cause or principle of unity, and thus are the most obvious candidates for application of the Unity-Cause Principle. These brief comments set the stage for an alternative interpretation of H 6. Commentators such as Ross and Rorty apparently think that Aristotle's discussion of the unity of the definition of composite substance is subordinate to his discussion of the unity of the definition of form, and was written in order to account for the unity of the definition of form. Harte argues that Aristotle discusses the unity of composite substance in order to show that the unity of form is the cause of the unity of composite substance. She claims that in H 6 "a composite's unity is secured only by the unity of form."
33 On this interpretation, the unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance is a secondary topic.
However, nowhere in H 6 does Aristotle claim that the unity of the definition of the composite is discussed merely in order to explain the unity of the definition of form. On the contrary, he states that the problems for form and composite
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Harte, "Metaphysics H 6," 279. She then adds: "What i claim is simply that, for the purposes of exposition, the discussion of the unity of the composite must precede the statement of the unity of form. And this is the procedure which Aristotle adopts in H 6, since it is to an account of the unity of form that the question governing the chapter is directed." m e t a p h y s i c s h 6 a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f u n i t y substance are the same, and thus that both should yield to essentially the same solution. This same solution is that there neither is, nor is there any need for, a unifying cause of the parts of definition.
2.2.1
Contrary to the view of Ross, Rorty, and Harte, Aristotle is not arguing that the unity of the definition of composite substance provides an analogy which helps to explain the unity of the definition of form. At H 6 1045a25-29, right after he explains the difficulty of the unity of the form, Aristotle states that the same difficulty arises in respect to the definition of form and in respect to the definition of composite substance, and the same solution can be offered in respect to both difficulties.
For this difficulty is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of 'cloak': for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze'? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. (1045a25-29) A bronze sphere, a typical composite substance, 34 is defined as "round bronze," and, according to Aristotle, the definitory formula (lov go~) of the composite faces the same difficulty as the definition (oJ rismoṽ) of form. For the same question of the cause of its unity arises, and arises for the same reason: the universal scope of the Unity-Cause Principle. neither here nor anywhere else is there a hint of the priority of one problem to the other. even though Aristotle's resolution of the problem of the unity of definition of form is couched in terms of form and matter, and potentiality and actuality, and even though he employs conceptual tools found in his discussion of the composition of composite substance, the basis of the problem is a metaphysical principle that is indifferent to such questions of priority, and his resolution applies to both form and composite substance. in addition to solving the supposed problem of the causeless unity of form and matter, Aristotle further clarifies what it is to be a cause of being in composite substances. The need for such a clarification indicates that an understanding of composite substance merely as form and matter still can be problematic. even though Aristotle mentions a "cause" in the quoted passage, such a cause should not be understood as a unifying cause of parts, but a cause of generation and being. in effect, Aristotle is replacing the original question, "What is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze'?" (tiv ai[ tion tou` ej n ei\ nai to; strogguv lon kai; tov n calkov n) with a new question, "What causes that which was potentially to be actually?" (tiv ou\ n touv tou ai[ tion, tou` to; dunav mei o] n ej nergeiv a/ ei\ nai).
35 in the case of a composite substance that is generated, there is a cause of its generation, a cause that moves what is potential to be actual. Such a cause is an efficient cause. it is
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At 1035a25-26 Aristotle states that "those things which are the form and matter together, e.g., the snub, or the bronze circle, pass away into these materials, and the matter is a part of them." The snub and the bronze circle are typical examples of composite substances.
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gill, Substance, 169. She argues that the efficient cause here unifies form and matter. This interpretation is not correct. The question of the cause of the unity of form and matter is not the question of the cause of matter's being the form. The latter asks for the cause of change, of the movement from potentiality to actuality.
40
journal of the history of philosophy 46:1 january 2008 the only cause that can intelligibly be asked for, as it is the cause that explains the change. That there is no unifying cause for the unity of parts when parts are understood in terms of form and matter is not in conflict with the view that there is a cause for a being's generation and existence. in this sense, there is a cause of the being of composite substance.
Aristotle repeats the same solution at 1045b7-16. After discussing the previously mentioned attempts to explain the unity of various composite things, he offers the same solution to the difficulty in explaining the unity of the parts of the definition of the composite and of the parts of the definition of form.
The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing; the one potentially, and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general is the cause of unity and of a thing's being one; for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without qualification essentially unities. (1045b16-23)
The original question, which asked for the cause of the unity of a composite substance, is based on the erroneous assumptions that (a) form and matter are two different things and that (b) form and matter need to be unified by something else.
36 The source of the problem is assumption (a), that form and matter are two different things, 'parts' in one sense of the term. Aristotle's solution is that, in a sense, they are not-that "the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing." The only meaningful question to be asked about the cause is, "How does the potential become actual?" At 1045b15-28 he claims that in the case of composite substance, there is a cause that "causes the movement from potency to actuality." There are only four causes which answer the question "why?"-and actually, strictly speaking, there are really only two causes, form and matter, that answer that question. Form plays three causal roles, figuring in efficient, formal, and final causation. 37 The unity of form and matter is a question not to be asked-or, better, is not a question to ask. There is no unifying cause which unifies form and matter. in that respect, a composite substance is different from a form, for a form has no cause whatsoever, since it does not contain any matter. The question "How does the potential become actual?" does not apply to form. in effect, Aristotle is borrowing a page from-actually, supplying a page for-contemporary analytic philosophy by telling his fellow philosophers that their questions are ill-formed, based on erroneous metaphysical assumptions, and thus need not be answered, but should instead be rejected.
Aristotle offers what he regards as the correct solution to the problem of the unity of the definition of composite substance, a solution that utilizes the concepts of form and matter. The solution is not based on the unity of the definition of form at all.
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Harte, "Metaphysics H 6," 292. With gill, Harte thinks that Aristotle is investigating the cause of the unity of form and matter. Both take the unifying cause of form and matter to be identical with the cause of matter becoming form. i take these two causes to be different. The cause of matter becoming form is different from the unifying cause of form and matter.
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Physics ii 7, 198a14-27. 42 journal of the history of philosophy 46:1 january 2008 and the other as matter, the unity of the definition of a thing is ensured and the problem evaporates.
The problem of the unity of the definition of composite substance is independent of considerations having to do with the unity of the definition of form; the problem is based on the simple fact that a composite substance is composed of parts. The problem of explaining the unity of composite substance is the problem of explaining the unity of the parts of its definition. even if it is granted that form is a unity and form is the cause of the unity of the material parts of composite substance, it is still true that form is a part of composite substance in the sense that it's an element of the definition of composite substance, and thus its unity plays no role in explaining the unity of form and matter in the definition.
3 . c o n c l u s i o n i have argued that H 6 should be taken as Aristotle's clarification of the causelessness of the unity of the parts of definition. On my interpretation, in H 6 Aristotle is concerned with a general metaphysical problem affecting-threatening-his theory of substance at two major points. The unity of genus and differentia in the definition of form must be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. if it were not accounted for, form would not be the primary cause of being and thus not primary substance. The unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance also must be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. if it were not accounted for, the definition of composite substance would be merely a formula referring to parts in need of a unifying cause, and would not be a formula of the essence of composite substance. Composite substance would not then be a substance at all.
This interpretation also offers a solution to the ongoing dispute about which definitional unity-that of form or that of composite substance-is the primary object of inquiry of H 6. in brief, my answer is neither. H 6 should not be taken in an exclusionary way, either as an inquiry into the unity of the definition of form or as an inquiry into the unity of the definition of composite substance. The treatment of neither problem is logically or metaphysically prior to the other. The unity of the parts of the definition of form is not explained, even if the unity of the parts-form and matter-of composite substance is accounted for. And the unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance cannot be explained, even if the unity of parts of the definition of form (which is itself a component of composite substance) is accounted for. Unless the parts of definition are taken to be form and matter or actuality and potentiality, and ultimately to refer to the one and the same thing, a difficulty for which no solution is possible is the result. The unity of both the definition of form and the definition of composite substance must be explained without appeal to a unifying cause, and neither is prior to another. The problem addressed is different from and more basic than those that commentators have hitherto identified. i would like to thank michael Wreen and especially three anonymous referees for a number of positive, constructive, and therefore very useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
